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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20050670-CA

v.
DAVID CARL REED,
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of
attempted child kidnaping, a first degree felony (R. 203-05).
This court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to the
pourover provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a3(2) (j) (West 2004) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Was the evidence that defendant, who first attempted to
expose himself to a 12-year-old girl and, a few minutes later,
opened the back door of his vehicle and ordered her to get in,
sufficient to support a conviction for attempted child kidnaping?
A criminal conviction based on a jury verdict will be
reversed for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is "so
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that "reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant

committed the crime."

State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah

1994)(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301.1(1), governing child kidnaping,
provides:
(1) An actor commits child kidnaping if the
actor intentionally or knowingly, without
authority of law, and by any means and in any
manner, seizes, confines, detains, or
transports a child under the age of 14
without the consent of the victim's parent or
guardian, or the consent of a person acting
in loco parentis.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(West 2004), defining attempt,
provides in pertinent part:
(1) For purposes of this part, a person is
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if he:
(a) engages in conduct constituting a
substantial step toward commission of the
crime; and
(b)(i) intends to commit the crime; or
(ii) when causing a particular result
is an element of the crime, he acts with an
awareness that his conduct is reasonably
certain to cause that result.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct
constitutes a substantial step if it strongly
corroborates the actor's mental state as
defined in Subsection (1)(b).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of attempted child
kidnaping, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-301.1 (R. 1-3). A jury convicted him as charged (R. 203-

2

05).

The court sentenced him to three-years-to-life in the Utah

State Prison, with credit for time served; ordered him to pay
$500 plus interest to a sentence trust; and ordered restitution,
if necessary, for victim counseling (id.).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The 12-year-old female victim was walking her dog west in a
residential area on 500 South in Salt Lake when defendant pulled
up on the opposite side of the street, across from a "tot lot"
park, and stopped his car (R. 226: 24, 33, 76, 102-103).

Both

the victim and defendant agree about what happened next.
Defendant described the encounter: "I planned on exposing myself
to her.

I got in a position in the car to where my belt line was

above the door, and I said,

A

Hey' . . .

I had my hand on my belt

and the tip of the zipper between my fingers, that was it." (Id.
at 104; accord id. at 24-25, 33) .
The victim "got scared," looked away from defendant, and
"kept walking" west on 500 South towards the intersection with
1000 West (Id. at 25-26, 77).

Defendant then made a u-turn,

drove past the victim on the same side of the street, and stopped
at the stop sign on the corner of 500 South and 1000 West (Id. at
36-37, 77, 81-82).

As the girl approached, defendant reached

over the front seat and "just opened the back - the right-back
door, and he yelled, 'Get in'" in "a demanding way" (Id. at 26,
28).

Scared, the victim "ran across the street and ran into the

alley. . . trying to run back home" (Id. at 28).
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A neighbor, newly home from work and enjoying a cup of
coffee on his front porch across the street from the park, saw
defendant pull up directly in front of his house to talk to the
girl (Id. at 76). He testified, "She kept shaking her head, no.
That's what got my attention.

She kept shaking her head, no.

I

knew something was going on" (Id. at 80). The neighbor watched
defendant as he made a U-turn and drove past the girl to the stop
sign.

He testified:
[Defendant s]topped right there in front of
the stop sign on the right side of the
street. The little girl was walking up. She
got to where that stop sign was that says you
got to stop at the next stop sign. . . and
she got up to right there, and the next thing
you know, she runs across the street. The
guy in the car turned and turned the corner.
He almost wiped out another car when he was
turning the corner to take off.

Id. at 77.

Explaining further, the neighbor stated that

defendant make a left turn at the stop sign, "booking it,"
clearly in a hurry.

Id. at 78, 82.

After the girl crossed the street, she and her dog entered
the alley, where she saw a vehicle at the other end (Id. 29, 40).
Fearing it might be defendant again, she reversed directions and
ran to a house on the corner of the alley and 500 South
"[b]ecause I know the people that live there" (Id. at 29-30).
The grandmother of the girl's friend responded to her "pounding
on the door" (Id. at 48). The grandmother testified that the
girl was crying, shaking, and hysterical and said "that there was
a man in a brown car trying to get her into the car" (Id. at 49).
4

More specifically, the girl told her that the man pulled over,
opened the back passenger door of his car, and told her to get in
(Id. at 49-50, 54). The grandmother called the police (Id. at
52).

As the two were waiting on the front porch for the police

to arrive, the girl said, "There goes the car/ 7 and the
grandmother looked up to see "just a flash" of "an old brown
four-door . . .

an Oldsmobile or something like that" as it drove

out of sight (Id.).
Based on the information the girl gave the police, defendant
was soon apprehended.

An officer drove the girl to a nearby

location, where she identified defendant, who was standing
outside on the grass, as the man who had accosted her (Id. at 8788) .
At trial, defendant testified that when the police
interviewed him later that day, he only gradually conceded what
he had done (IcL at 62-64, 109-10; see also R. 202). He admitted
that he had planned to expose himself to the victim to get a
"rush" or a "thrill" (IcL_ at 106-07, 111, 119).

He also admitted

that the girl ignored him the first time, thus denying him the
rush he was seeking (Id. at 119). He repeatedly denied that when
he stopped at the stop sign, he either opened the car door or
ordered the girl to get into the car (Id. at 64-65, 68-69, 108,
114; see also R. 202: 9, 25, 43).
After hearing all the evidence, the jury convicted defendant
as charged (R. 179).

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction for attempted child kidnaping.

This

contention turns on the credibility of the witnesses.

Here, the

jury apparently believed the victim when she testified that
defendant first accosted her at the tot lot and then subsequently
both opened the car door and demanded that she get in.

The jury

may also have believed that defendant circled around to the alley
and was awaiting the victim at the other end when she ran down
the alley.

The jury also believed that the testimony of the

neighbor and the grandmother corroborated the girl's version of
the events.

Where credibility determinations are within the

province of the jury and the appellate court does not revisit
them, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for
attempted child kidnaping.
ARGUMENT
WHEN VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO THE JURY'S VERDICT,
WITH DEFERENCE TO THE JURY'S
CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS, THE
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT OPENED HIS
CAR DOOR AND ORDERED THE GIRL TO
GET IN SUFFICES TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR
ATTEMPTED CHILD KIDNAPING
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to
establish that he engaged in conduct constituting a substantial
step towards kidnaping the 12-year-old victim.
at 17-18.

Defendant's argument has two prongs.

6

See Br. of Aplt.
First, he

contends that "[i]t is questionable whether [defendant] actually
opened the car door and said,

A

Get in,' as [the victim] claimed"

(Id. at 20). And second, even if defendant did say and do as the
victim asserted, he argues that his conduct did not amount to the
"substantial step" required to convict on attempted child
kidnaping because "it is not reasonable to conclude that this
conduct strongly corroborated that [defendant] intentionally or
knowingly acted to commit child kidnaping" (Id. at 21).
The trial court considered these arguments at the end of the
state's case, when defendant moved to dismiss for failure to make
a prima facie case.

In denying defendant's motion, the court

first acknowledged that it was within the province of the jury to
reconcile any inconsistencies in the testimony.

See R. 226: 96.

The court then ruled:
There being a child involved in this, I think
that if I look at the testimony in the light
most favorable to the State for purpose of
dismissal, I think they have established a
prima facie case.
The evidence I have is that [defendant]
opened the door and in a demanding voice
ordered [the girl] to get in the car. If she
had gotten in the car, even for an instant,
that probably would have been a kidnaping. I
think [the State] made a substantial - at
least for the purpose of a prima facie case,
the opening of the door, and he demanding
that she get in is a substantial step towards
the possibility of detaining her against her
will or without any authority, so I'm going
to deny your motion. I think that they have
established a prima facie case.
Id. at 97-98.
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This ruling is correct.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence following a criminal conviction, this Court's role is
limited.

State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994).

A

reviewing court will reverse a criminal conviction on
insufficiency grounds only when the evidence is so lacking that
"reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" that
defendant committed the crime.

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443,

444 (Utah 1983) , superseded on other grounds, State v. Walker,
743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987).

However, "[w]here there is any

evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
it, from which findings of all the elements of the crime can be
made beyond a reasonable doubt, our inquiry is complete and we
will sustain the verdict."

State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285

(Utah 1989).
In this case, defendant's insufficiency argument turns on
two contentions.

First, he asserts that the truth of the

victim's statement that defendant opened the car door and ordered
her to get in is "questionable" because her testimony as a whole
suffered from imprecision and from inconsistencies with the
testimony of other witnesses (Br. of Aplt. at 20-21).

As a

pivotal inconsistency, defendant cites to the testimony of the
neighbor in front of whose home defendant originally stopped,
asserting that it "directly contradicted" the victim's testimony
about defendant's opening the car door and ordering her to get in
(Id. at 21). The neighbor's testimony, however, did not
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contradict the victim's.

The neighbor testified only that he did

not see defendant either turn around in the car or open the car
door (R. 226: 83-84).
happened.

He did not assert that these things never

And, indeed, from his vantage point, half a block away

on the opposite side of the street, with defendant's passenger
door beyond his purview, his testimony is easily squared with
that of the victim.

Moreover, all other testimony of the victim

that defendant cites as imprecise or inconsistent can only be
characterized as inconsequential, such as the color and style of
defendant's hair (about which the victim never expressed any
surety); details about the car; and where the victim stood while
her friend's grandmother called the police (a matter clearly
explained by the grandmother).

See Br. of Aplt. at 20.

In any event, defendant's argument fails because defendant
ignores the role of credibility in the jury's assessment of the
evidence.

The law is well-settled that "determinations of

witness credibility are left to the jury.

The jury is free to

believe or disbelieve all or part of any witness's testimony."
State v. Haves, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 1993)(citing State
v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 901, 904-05 (Utah App. 1990).
When the evidence presented is conflicting or
disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive
judge of both the credibility of witnesses
and the weight to be given particular
evidence. Ordinarily, a reviewing court may
not reassess credibility or reweigh the
evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the
evidence in favor of the jury verdict.
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State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993)(citations
omitted).

Furthermore, minor inconsistencies or contradictions

in a witness's testimony will not warrant reversal based on
insufficient evidence.

State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 809 (Utah

App. 1998).
As a secondary argument, defendant contends that even if he
opened the car door and ordered the 12-year-old girl to get in,
that conduct did not amount to an attempted child kidnaping
because it did not constitute a "substantial step toward
commission of the crime."

Utah Code Ann. §76-4-101(2).

"In order for conduct to constitute a substantial step,
there must be more than mere preparation."
P.2d 1150, 1157 (Utah 1991).

State v. Johnson, 821

Further, the conduct must "strongly

corroborate[]" the defendant's intent to commit the underlying
crime.

Utah Code Ann. §76-4-101(2).

The Model Penal Code, whose

definition resembles Utah's attempt statute, lists as an example
of conduct that constitutes a substantial step:
(a) lying in wait, searching for or following
the contemplated victim of the crime; . . .
Model Penal Code §5.01 (2) (2002) .

See also State v. Casey, 2003

UT 55, 1 26, 82 P.3d 1106 (noting that while Utah's attempt
statute is based on the Model Penal Code, "in contradiction to
the M.P.C., [Utah's statute] requires intentional conduct").
In this case, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict, defendant's actions, both by
word and deed, strongly corroborated his intent to kidnap the
10

girl.

Specifically, he pulled up across the street from her and

verbally accosted her, while lifting himself up and fiddling with
his zipper (R. 226: 24-25, 33, 104). When she turned her back on
him, he made a u-turn, followed her, passed her, and stopped on
the same side of the road, a bit ahead of her (Id. at 36-37, 77,
81-82).

Furthermore, when the girl approached, defendant opened

his car door and demanded that she get in (Id. at 26, 28). When
she ran across the street away from him, he turned left, and the
girl then thought she saw his car at the other end of the alley
she ran into, trying to escape (Id. at 29-30, 40). Taken as a
whole, defendant's actions fall within the ambit of "searching
for or following the contemplated victim of the crime," one of
several kinds of conduct constituting a "substantial step"
towards commission of the crime.
Defendant's arguments that his true intent was to frighten
the girl into running away, "thereby giving him the thrill he was
seeking" and that it was unlikely that a pre-teen walking a large
dog would get in the car, are unavailing (Id. at 22-23).

The

fatal flaw in defendant's insufficiency argument is his
presumption "that the jury was obligated to believe the evidence
most favorable to defendant rather than that presented in
opposition by the State."
1982).

State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah

When the evidence is viewed as it must be on appeal — in

the light most favorable to the verdict — it is plainly
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sufficient to support a conviction for attempted child kidnaping.
Defendant's claim, therefore, fails.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction on one count of attempted child kidnaping, a first
degree felony.
/—

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3 / day of January, 2006.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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